Unfortunately, his health took a downturn that same year, and he moved into the home of his daughter and sonin-law. He didn’t sell his ranch home and five acres, as he still went down to the old house occasionally to tinker. Unbeknownst to him, a criminal ring with ties to Indiana and Ohio was watching the home as well. They saw it unoccupied most days and pounced, breaking in and stealing financial documents and old checkbooks the family didn’t know were still in the house. Within hours of the burglary, online and credit bureau inquiries had been filed. The fraud fuse was lit. The drive-through teller at a local bank became suspicious when someone came to their window presenting a check as if written by their 98-year-old customer. The payee claimed it was for painting a house. The teller called the number they had on file for the veteran, speaking to his daughter, who had been added to the account. Neither she nor her father knew anything about the check or the payee. The bank called the police, but the perpetrators took off before officers arrived. A seven-month odyssey of fraud ensued, highlighting many of the macro issues facing banks challenged by the marketplace to make opening accounts and transacting business online faster and faster with less and less friction, and a criminal justice system that is not equipped or inclined to help. Chart 1, seen below, was created to try to persuade the FBI to take the case due to its overwhelming interstate nature, complexity, and the continuation of the fraud attempts as victims fought the fraud daily, not unlike “Whack-a-Mole.” Even with the victim being a decorated WWII veteran, the one time he called upon his country for help, they turned him away, saying, “We can’t work the case unless the loss exceeds $1 million.” The family was left to fight banks, credit card companies and lenders where accounts were opened using the victim’s name and personal identifiers at record speed, while the perpetrators continued their fraud unabated. Chart 1 This chart, produced by Jim Rechel for use by law enforcement and court presentations as part of a victim impact statement, shows changes of address at BMVs and the U.S. Postal Service, fraudulent checking accounts, forged checks, credit cards and credit bureau requests from the victim’s case. tt // sĞƚĞƌĂŶ ƵƌŐůĂƌLJ – ŽůĞƌĂŝŶ dŽǁŶƐŚŝƉ W tt // sĞƚĞƌĂŶ ŚĞĐŬŬͬͬ / dŚĞĨƚ &ƌĂƵĚ &ůŽǁĐŚĂƌƚ ^ƚŽůĞŶ ŚĞĐŬƐ &ƌĂƵĚƵůĞŶƚ ƌĞĚŝƚ ĐĐŽƵŶƚƐ ƉƉůŝĞĚ &Žƌ ; ůƵĞ >ŝŶĞƐͿ /ŵƉŽƐƚĞƌ ^ƚŽůĞŶ ĐŬƐ ƉĂƐƐĞĚ ŽŶ WZ Ϯ͕ ϯ͕ ϰ͕ Θ ϲƚŚ ;Ψϯϭ͕ ϳϰϬ͘ ϬϬ >ŽƐƐͿ ^ƚŽůĞŶ ĐŬƐ ƉĂƐƐĞĚ ŽŶ WZ ϭϱ ĂŶĚ WZ ϭϳ ;ΨϭϬ͕ ϴϱϬ͘ ϬϬ >ŽƐƐͿ &ƌĂƵĚ ƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞƐ Ăƚ EŽƌƚŚŐĂƚĞ ĂŶĚ ,ĂƌƌŝƐŽŶ ǀĞ ŽŶ :hE ϵ͕ ϭϮ͕ ϭϯ͕ ϭϵ ;Ψϰ͕ Ϭϯϴ͘ Ϯϭ >ŽƐƐͿ ϯ ĂĐĐƚƐ ŽƉĞŶĞĚ :hE ϴ >ŽƐƐ WƌĞǀĞŶƚĞĚ ĐĐƚƐ ŽƉĞŶĞĚ :hE ϭϬ >ŽƐƐ WƌĞǀĞŶƚĞĚ ĐĐƚ ŽƉĞŶĞĚ :hE ϭ >ŽƐƐ WƌĞǀĞŶƚĞĚ ĨĨŝƌŵ /ŶĐ͘ KŶůŝŶĞ &ŝŶĂŶĐĞ ĐĐƚ KƉĞŶĞĚ WZ ϮϮ >ŽƐƐ WƌĞǀĞŶƚĞĚ KŶůŝŶĞ &ŝŶĂŶĐĞ Ϯ ĐĐƚƐ ĂƉƉůŝĞĚ ĨŽƌ ĞĂƌůLJ :hE ƌĞĚŝƚ ƵƌĞĂƵ ƌĞƋƵĞƐƚ ŽŶůŝŶĞ :hE ϰ KƉĞŶĞĚ D z Ϯϭ >ŽƐƐ WƌĞǀĞŶƚĞĚ ^ƚŽůĞŶ tt // sĞƚĞƌĂŶ ĐŬƐ ĚĞƉŽƐŝƚĞĚ ƚŽ ƉŚŽŶLJ ĂĐĐƚ MARCH/APRIL 2024 33
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